A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort

被引:10
|
作者
Marschak, Thomas [1 ]
Shanthikumar, J. George [2 ]
Zhou, Junjie [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Walter A Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[3] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 20043, Peoples R China
关键词
newsvendor; inventory management; information gathering; demand forecasting; ADVANCE DEMAND INFORMATION; SUPPLY CHAIN; ORDER INFORMATION; INVENTORY CONTROL; RISK-AVERSE; UNCERTAINTY; VARIABILITY; RANDOMNESS; DECISIONS; CAPACITY;
D O I
10.1111/poms.12208
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
We study a newsvendor who can acquire the services of a forecaster, or, more generally, an information gatherer (IG) to improve his information about demand. When the IG's effort increases, does the average ex ante order quantity rise or fall? Do average ex post sales rise or fall? Improvements in information technology and in the services offered by forecasters provide motivation for the study of these questions. Much depends on our model of the IG and his efforts. We study an IG who sends a signal to a classic single-period newsvendor. The signal defines the newsvendor's posterior probability distribution on the possible demands and the newsvendor uses that posterior to calculate the optimal order. Each of the possible posteriors is a scale/location transform of the same base distribution. When the IG works harder, the average scale parameter drops. Higher IG effort is always useful to the newsvendor. We show that there is a critical value of order cost. For costs on one side of this value more IG effort leads to a higher average ex ante order and for costs on the other side to a lower average order. But for all costs, more IG effort leads to higher average ex post sales. We obtain analogous results for a regret-averse newsvendor who suffers a penalty that is a nonlinear function of the discrepancy between quantity ordered and true demand.
引用
收藏
页码:110 / 133
页数:24
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] WHO CHOOSES ENGINEERING?
    Fitzsimmons, J. P.
    IEEE SPECTRUM, 2008, 45 (11) : 8 - 8
  • [2] Who Chooses the One Who Chooses? On a Forced Choice of Shakespearean Epistemology and Textology
    Habjan, Jernej
    PRIMERJALNA KNJIZEVNOST, 2010, 33 (02): : 193 - 202
  • [3] WHO CHOOSES THE GENES
    HERMAN, A
    SCIENCES-NEW YORK, 1993, 33 (01): : 47 - 47
  • [4] Who Chooses the Rules?
    Garrett, Elizabeth
    ELECTION LAW JOURNAL, 2005, 4 (02): : 139 - 146
  • [5] Who chooses, who loses.
    West, EG
    ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION REVIEW, 1998, 17 (02) : 223 - 225
  • [6] Who chooses to inflation target?
    Goncalves, Carlos Eduardo S.
    Carvalho, Alexandre
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2008, 99 (02) : 410 - 413
  • [7] Who Chooses and Who Offers Texts for Selection?
    Dolinar, Darko
    PRIMERJALNA KNJIZEVNOST, 2010, 33 (02): : 227 - 241
  • [8] Who Chooses a Trial of Labor?
    Naqvi, Mariam
    Goldfarb, Ilona
    Barth, William H., Jr.
    Kaimal, Anjali
    REPRODUCTIVE SCIENCES, 2015, 22 : 145A - 145A
  • [9] Who Chooses a Welding Career?
    Cullison, Andrew
    Johnsen, Mary Ruth
    Woodward, Howard
    Campbell, Kristin
    WELDING JOURNAL, 2009, 88 (07) : 28 - 36
  • [10] WHO CHOOSES PRIME MINISTER
    BABST, DV
    INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, 1971, 13 (07): : 13 - &