Building anti-corruption agency collaboration and reputation: Hanging together or separately hanged

被引:2
|
作者
Bautista-Beauchesne, Nicholas [1 ]
机构
[1] Ecole Natl Adm Publ ENAP, Publ Adm, Montreal, PQ, Canada
关键词
anti-corruption agency; Bureaucratic autonomy; bureaucratic reputation theory; legitimacy; inter-agency collaboration; ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION; COORDINATION; MANAGEMENT; SECURITY; TIME;
D O I
10.1111/rego.12433
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The implementation of preventive anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has been a significant public administration regulatory trend of the last two decades. This article endeavors to better understand how preventive ACAs build inter-agency collaboration and legitimacy. Rather than analyzing ACAs in isolation, this article proposes a novel understanding of autonomy-building by accounting for the underlying reputational dimension of their broader collaborative environment: ACAs need to strike a delicate equilibrium between defending their organizational uniqueness and effectively collaborating to tackle the complexity of corruption. To achieve this, the article employs a mixed-methods multiple case study of four preventive ACAs in Quebec (Canada) over the last decade.
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页码:1399 / 1419
页数:21
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