So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships

被引:233
|
作者
Bharath, Sreedhar
Dahiya, Sandeep
Saunders, Anthony
Srinivasan, Anand
机构
[1] NYU, New York, NY 10012 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[3] Georgetown Univ, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[4] NUS Business Sch, Singapore 117952, Singapore
关键词
lending relationships; bank loans; information asymmetry; debt/equity underwriting;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.08.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship tender's informational advantage over a non-relationship lender may generate a higher probability of selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 42%, while for a non-relationship lender, this probability is 3%. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater information asymmetries are significantly likely to obtain future loans from their relationship lenders. Relationship lenders are likely to be chosen to provide debt/equity underwriting services, but this effect is economically small. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:368 / 419
页数:52
相关论文
共 50 条