Derivative usage and firm value: The influence of agency costs and monitoring problems

被引:68
|
作者
Fauver, Larry [1 ]
Naranjo, Andy [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tennessee, Dept Finance, Stokely Management Ctr 424, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
[2] Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business, Hough Grad Sch Business, Dept Finance Insurance & Real Estate, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
关键词
Derivative usage; Firm valuation; Information asymmetry; Agency costs; Monitoring problems; Behavioral finance; FREE CASH FLOW; RISK-MANAGEMENT; CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUATION; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; CURRENCY; HEDGE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.09.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using derivative usage data on over 1746 firms headquartered in the U.S. during the 1991 through 2000 time period, we find that firms with greater agency and monitoring problems (i.e., firms that are less transparent, face greater agency costs, have weaker corporate governance, larger information asymmetry problems, and overall poorer monitoring) exhibit a negative association between Tobin's Q and derivative usage. The negative valuation effect is also economically significant with an impact of -8.4% on Tobin's Q from a one standard deviation change in the firm monitoring index. The results are robust to alternative specifications, time varying estimates, econometric procedures that correct for potential clustering of errors, endogeneity problems, and sample selection biases among other robustness checks discussed in the paper. We conclude that derivative usage has a negative impact on firm value in firms with greater agency and monitoring problems. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:719 / 735
页数:17
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Does Centralisation of FX Derivative Usage Impact Firm Value?
    Jankensgard, Hakan
    EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2015, 21 (02) : 309 - 332
  • [2] AGENCY COSTS AND THE AGRICULTURAL FIRM
    ROUMASSET, J
    UY, M
    LAND ECONOMICS, 1987, 63 (03) : 290 - 302
  • [3] Multiple banking relationships, agency costs and firm value: evidence from India
    Jadiyappa, Nemiraja
    Sireesha, Bhanu
    Hickman, L. Emily
    Jyothi, Pavana
    MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2019, 46 (01) : 1 - 18
  • [4] AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
    FAMA, EF
    JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) : 288 - 307
  • [5] Does derivative usage boost firm value in an economy with controls? Evidence from India
    Gupta, Praveen
    Mallick, Sushanta
    Bathia, Deven
    REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING, 2024,
  • [6] IMPACT OF DERIVATIVE USAGE ON FIRM'S RISK AND VALUE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN AND MALAYSIA
    Alam, Atia
    Afza, Talat
    ARGUMENTA OECONOMICA, 2017, 38 (01): : 221 - 242
  • [7] How do agency problems affect firm value? - Evidence from China
    Xiao, Sheng
    Zhao, Shan
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2014, 20 (7-9): : 803 - 828
  • [8] Agency conflicts, firm value, and monitoring mechanisms: An empirical evidence from Indonesia
    Faisal, Faisal
    Abd Majid, M. Shabri
    Sakir, A.
    COGENT ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2020, 8 (01):
  • [9] Environmental regulations, agency costs, and firm performance
    Baxamusa, Mufaddal
    Jalal, Abu
    RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE, 2024, 70
  • [10] Agency Costs, Family Ties, and Firm Efficiency
    Herrero, Ines
    JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2011, 37 (03) : 887 - 904