Optimal Transmission Investment With Regulated Incentives Based Upon Forward Considerations of Firm and Intermittent Resources With Batteries

被引：8

作者：

Khastieva, Dina ^{[1
]}

Mohammadi, Saeed ^{[1
]}

Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza ^{[1
]}

Bunn, Derek ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] KTH Royal Inst Technol, Sch Elect Engn & Comp Sci, S-10044 Stockholm, Sweden

[2] London Business Sch, Subject Area Management Sci & Operat, London NW1 4SA, England

来源：

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS | 2021年 / 36卷 / 05期

关键词：

Investment; Regulators; Batteries; Companies; Generators; Mathematical model; Wind; Battery-storage system; forward-looking transmission investment; incentive regulation; GENERATION; EXPANSION; COORDINATION; STORAGE; MECHANISM;

D O I：

10.1109/TPWRS.2021.3068052

中图分类号：

TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];

学科分类号：

0808 ; 0809 ;

摘要：

Regulatory support for transmission investment by private investors follows a complex process of dialogue, information sharing, commitments, and incentives. Whilst this process has attracted substantial research, the formulation of efficient solutions still remains an open question and this has become more complex with the emergence of new intermittent and battery-storage resources. We propose an optimal incentive solution in which the private transmission company earns congestion rents and an incentive fee, set by agreement with the regulator. This fee is set in the context of assessing the impact of current and future generation resources (conventional, intermittent, and batteries) on the congestion rents. The welfare-optimizing solution follows from a mixed integer, nonlinear, bilevel optimization problem, which is computationally challenging. We re-cast the problem for tractability and devise a disjunctive-based decomposition algorithm. Its performance has been successfully demonstrated on two standard IEEE case studies.

引用

页码：4420 / 4434

页数：15