Access Pricing Collusion Based on Dynamic Price Competition Model for China's 3G Telecom Operators

被引：0

作者：

Xu, Min ^{[1
]}

Xu, Yong ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] HUHAI Univ, Sch Business, Nanjing 211000, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

[2] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Nanjing 210096, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

来源：

2014 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH (SSR 2014), PT 2 | 2014年 / 6卷

关键词：

Dynamic price competition; Access pricing collusion; Product quality; Nash equilibrium;

D O I：

10.5729/asbs.vol6.162

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we developed a dynamic price competition model for telecom oligarchs taking into account the characteristics of network externalities as well as the differences in product quality. We studied respectively the impact of original quality, technology innovation, access pricing, and quality changes on price competition equilibrium. In the dynamic price competition, the operator who always has better quality gets higher profits. We also find that the lower access pricing, the stronger collusion stability. Given the access pricing, there is an interval of retailing price for the two successful collusive operators. If any of the two collusive operators improves quality, collusion stability will be increased.

引用

页码：162 / 168

页数：7