Positive interactions may decrease cooperation in social dilemma experiments

被引:4
|
作者
Wardil, Lucas [1 ]
Silva, Ivair R. [2 ]
da Silva, Jafferson K. L. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Fed Minas Gerais, Dept Fis, BR-31270901 Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil
[2] Univ Fed Ouro Preto, Dept Estat, BR-35400000 Ouro Preto, Brazil
关键词
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS; BEHAVIOR; UNCERTAINTY; SPILLOVER; EVOLUTION; RISK;
D O I
10.1038/s41598-018-37674-5
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
A social dilemma appears in the public goods problem, where the individual has to decide whether to contribute to a common resource. The total contributions to the common pool are increased by a synergy factor and evenly split among the members. The ideal outcome occurs if everyone contributes the maximum amount. However, regardless of what the others do, each individual is better off by contributing nothing. Yet, cooperation is largely observed in human society. Many mechanisms have been shown to promote cooperation in humans, alleviating, or even resolving, the social dilemma. One class of mechanisms that is under-explored is the spillover of experiences obtained from different environments. There is some evidence that positive experiences promote cooperative behaviour. Here, we address the question of how experiencing positive cooperative interactions - obtained in an environment where cooperation yields high returns - affects the level of cooperation in social dilemma interactions. In a laboratory experiment, participants played repeated public goods games (PGGs) with rounds alternating between positive interactions and social dilemma interactions. We show that, instead of promoting pro-social behaviour, the presence of positive interactions lowered the level of cooperation in the social dilemma interactions. Our analysis suggests that the high return obtained in the positive interactions sets a reference point that accentuates participants' perceptions that contributing in social dilemma interactions is a bad investment.
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页数:10
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