Humean laws, circularity, and contrastivity

A well-known objection to Humean accounts of laws (e.g. BSA, Lewis in Australas J Philos 61:343-377, 1983, Philosophical papers vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1986) charges them with circularity (Armstrong in What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 102; Maudlin in The metaphysics within physics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 172). While the view has it that particular facts explain the natural laws, natural laws are often relied upon in order to explain particular facts. Thus, the Humean is committed to circular explanations-or so goes the argument. In this paper, I review two ways of dealing with the circularity objection against Humean views of laws. Then, by introducing a contrastive treatment of explanations, I put forward a new one, which, if it does not end up dethroning its competitors, I am hoping is still worth exploring.