Geographic access markets and investments

被引：13
|
作者：
Bourreau, Marc [1 ,2 ]
Cambini, Carlo [3 ]
Hoernig, Steffen [4 ,5 ]
机构：
[1] Telecom ParisTech, Dept Econ & Social Sci, Paris, France
[2] CREST LEI, Paris, France
[3] Politecn Torino, EUI Florence Sch Regulat, Turin, Italy
[4] Univ Nova Lisboa, Nova Sch Business & Econ, P-1200 Lisbon, Portugal
[5] CEPR, London, England
来源：
INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY | 2015年 / 31卷
关键词：
Geographical access regulation; Wholesale competition; Infrastructure investment; STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS; COMPETITION; CONSTRAINTS; TECHNOLOGY; SPILLOVERS; COVERAGE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：13 / 21
页数：9
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