On the use of ceiling-price commitments by monopolists

被引:39
作者
Chen, YM
Rosenthal, RW
机构
[1] UNIV COLORADO,BOULDER,CO 80309
[2] BOSTON UNIV,BOSTON,MA 02215
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2555923
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The establishment of an asking, or ceiling price from which reductions can be bargained is a common selling practice, For a monopolist seller of a single object, this article characterizes the best such ceiling price and shows that its use is optimal among all incentive-compatible mechanisms in a class of situations characterized by customers (I) who arrive one at a time and so do not compete with each other directly and (2) who learn their idiosyncratic willingnesses to pay only by incurring idiosyncratic inspection costs.
引用
收藏
页码:207 / 220
页数:14
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