The Agency Effect of Repurchases on Closed-End Funds

被引:6
|
作者
An, Jingfeng [1 ]
Gemmill, Gordon [2 ]
Thomas, Dylan C. [3 ]
机构
[1] City Univ London, Cass Business Sch, London EC1Y 8TZ, England
[2] Univ Warwick, Warwick Business Sch, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] Swansea Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Swansea SA2 8PP, W Glam, Wales
关键词
repurchases; agency problem; closed-end funds; G30; G23; G14; OPEN-MARKET REPURCHASES; SHARE REPURCHASES; UNITED-KINGDOM; PERFORMANCE; RETURNS; ANNOUNCEMENTS; UNDERREACTION; LIQUIDITY; DIVIDENDS; POLICY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00529.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed-end funds when their discounts are widening (market-to-book is falling). The immediate post-announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance.
引用
收藏
页码:240 / 270
页数:31
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