Risk aversion as risk-neutral pessimism: A simple proof

被引:3
|
作者
Heaton, J. B. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Sch Law, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
Economic analysis of litigation; Risk aversion; Risk neutral probabilities; Pessimism; Criminal law; Plea bargains; Settlement; LEGAL; LITIGATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.irle.2018.07.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It has long been understood that risk aversion reduces the likelihood of suit. This article offers a simple proof that risk aversion is observationally equivalent to risk-neutral pessimism by applying a change of measure to risk-neutral probabilities. The observational equivalence of risk aversion to risk-neutral pessimism may provide a useful framework for proving results in the study of several areas of interest, including (1) the role of risk-transfer mechanisms like contingency fees and litigation funding; (2) calls for prohibitions on, or judicial participation in, plea bargains; and (3) broader judicial review of the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of settlements in individual (that is, non-class) civil actions. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:70 / 72
页数:3
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