Fiscal policy and macroeconomic stabilizations: What are the gains from cooperation?

In this paper we extend the open-economy stochastic framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (Q J Econ. 117:503-36, 2002) to include distortionary taxation, when prices are flexible but wages are sticky. We use the model to analyze the optimal design of tax rules that respond to productivity shocks, under non-cooperation and cooperation between the fiscal authorities, and evaluate the gains from coordination. We show that, although monetary policy would be preferred to fiscal policy as a stabilization tool both under competition (Nash) and under cooperation, there is a role for procyclical fiscal stabilization in a monetary union where the monetary authority cannot respond to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that in the Nash game there will be an incentive for the fiscal authorities to try to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor, and we estimate the potential gains from fiscal policy coordination. The size of the gains depends crucially on the value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For lower values of the Frisch elasticity (more in line with microeconometric estimates) the gains are relatively small, but for more elastic labor supplies (more in agreement with the business cycle literature) the gains can be very large.