When Is Employee Retaliation Acceptable at Work? Evidence from Quasi-Experiments

被引:11
|
作者
Charness, Gary [1 ]
Levine, David I. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Walter A Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS | 2010年 / 49卷 / 04期
关键词
PROFIT SEEKING; FAIRNESS; TESTS; CONSTRAINT; WORKPLACE; JUSTICE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-232X.2010.00614.x
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
When is employee retaliation acceptable in the workplace? We use a quasi-experimental design to study the acceptability of several forms of retaliatory behavior at work, gathering data in this untested area. Consistent with hypotheses from theories of fairness, we find that employee retaliation in the workplace is perceived to be more acceptable if it is an act of omission instead of an act of commission. We do not find that a more damaging retaliatory act is significantly less acceptable than a less damaging one, suggesting a qualitative rather than a quantitative relationship. We also find individual differences: Respondents who are older, female, politically conservative, and managers typically show less tolerance for retaliation, while union members are a bit more accepting than average.
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页码:499 / 523
页数:25
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