Weak parties in the electoral arena, strong parties in the legislative arena: The electoral connection in Brazil

This article analyzes the determinants of voting positions in the Brazilian House of Representatives (Chamber of Deputies) in relation to the preferences of the Executive Branch, focusing on the reasons leading Deputies to cooperate with or resist the President's interests oil votes. The article examines the role played by political parties in the Deputies' behavior both inside and outside Congress, as well as the main instruments used by the Executive to encourage cooperative legislative behavior, applying a multivariate econometric model to estimate the determinants of Deputies' votes. The authors conclude that Deputies, especially those belonging to parties in the government coalition, cooperate with the President, following the orientation provided by their party leaders, as a strategy to access political and financial benefits controlled by the Executive, which in turn can be used in the electoral arena in order to maximize their odds of political survival, and that these same Deputies are the ones with the greatest odds of being reelected.