Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market
被引:1
|
作者:
Loss, Frederic
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机构:
Univ Paris Dauphine LEDa SDFi, PSL, Pl Marechal Lattre de Tassigny, F-75016 Paris, FranceUniv Paris Dauphine LEDa SDFi, PSL, Pl Marechal Lattre de Tassigny, F-75016 Paris, France
Loss, Frederic
[1
]
Piaser, Gwenael
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h-index: 0
机构:
IPAG, Business Sch, 184 Blvd St Germain, F-75006 Paris, FranceUniv Paris Dauphine LEDa SDFi, PSL, Pl Marechal Lattre de Tassigny, F-75016 Paris, France
Piaser, Gwenael
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Paris Dauphine LEDa SDFi, PSL, Pl Marechal Lattre de Tassigny, F-75016 Paris, France
[2] IPAG, Business Sch, 184 Blvd St Germain, F-75006 Paris, France
Common agency;
Insurance;
Moral hazard;
Perfect competition;
Linear price equilibria;
MORAL-HAZARD;
COMMON AGENCY;
COMPETITION;
REVELATION;
SELECTION;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.006
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We consider a competitive insurance market in which agents can privately enter into multi-contractual insurance relationships and undertake hidden actions. We study the existence of a linear equilibrium when insurance companies have no restrictions on their pricing rules. For CARA utility functions, we show that a linear equilibrium always exists. For DARA utility functions, we provide sufficient conditions under which a linear equilibrium exists. We show that the linear equilibrium is unique, actuarially unfair, and induces partial insurance coverage. Lastly, we show that the linear equilibrium is always third-best efficient. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ New South Wales, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Univ New South Wales, Ctr Appl Econ Res, Sydney, NSW, AustraliaUniv New South Wales, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Li, Shengyu
Luo, Rong
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机构:
Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaUniv New South Wales, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW, Australia