Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market

被引:1
|
作者
Loss, Frederic [1 ]
Piaser, Gwenael [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris Dauphine LEDa SDFi, PSL, Pl Marechal Lattre de Tassigny, F-75016 Paris, France
[2] IPAG, Business Sch, 184 Blvd St Germain, F-75006 Paris, France
关键词
Common agency; Insurance; Moral hazard; Perfect competition; Linear price equilibria; MORAL-HAZARD; COMMON AGENCY; COMPETITION; REVELATION; SELECTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a competitive insurance market in which agents can privately enter into multi-contractual insurance relationships and undertake hidden actions. We study the existence of a linear equilibrium when insurance companies have no restrictions on their pricing rules. For CARA utility functions, we show that a linear equilibrium always exists. For DARA utility functions, we provide sufficient conditions under which a linear equilibrium exists. We show that the linear equilibrium is unique, actuarially unfair, and induces partial insurance coverage. Lastly, we show that the linear equilibrium is always third-best efficient. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:22 / 30
页数:9
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