Managing Chinese bureaucrats: An institutional economics perspective

被引:131
作者
Huang, YS [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-9248.00359
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Conventional analysis of government typically focuses on 'politics', that is, interests, conflicts or personalities. But governing a country is not only a task, of successfully governing its people but also an administrative task of managing subordinate officials. This is a very relevant issue in a country such as China, With a massive bureaucracy. The top 'managers' of the country - some 30 national leaders - make policies but also manage a large number of bureaucratic personnel. As in business organization,;, control problems occur when subordinates have different interests from these of the organization and when the behavior of subordinates is imperfectly monitored. Control mechanisms are designed to minimize such problems by either aligning interests or improving information. This article uses this framework to explain a wide variety of administrative phenomena in Chinese government organizations.
引用
收藏
页码:61 / 79
页数:19
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