Sovereign debt;
Default;
Multiple equilibria;
DEFAULT RISK;
REPUDIATION;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.10.013
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
A common view of sovereign debt markets is that they are prone to multiple equilibria. We prove that, to the contrary, Markov perfect equilibrium is unique in the widely studied model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and we discuss multiple extensions and limitations of this finding. Our results show that no improvement in a borrower's reputation for repayment can be self-sustaining, thereby strengthening the Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argument that debt cannot be sustained by reputation alone. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ N Carolina, Gardner Hall CB3305, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
Fed Reserve Bank Richmond, 701 East Byrd St, Richmond, VA 23219 USAUniv N Carolina, Gardner Hall CB3305, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA