Unique equilibrium in the Eaton-Gersovitz model of sovereign debt

被引:20
|
作者
Auclert, Adrien [1 ,2 ]
Rognlie, Matthew [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[4] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
Sovereign debt; Default; Multiple equilibria; DEFAULT RISK; REPUDIATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.10.013
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A common view of sovereign debt markets is that they are prone to multiple equilibria. We prove that, to the contrary, Markov perfect equilibrium is unique in the widely studied model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and we discuss multiple extensions and limitations of this finding. Our results show that no improvement in a borrower's reputation for repayment can be self-sustaining, thereby strengthening the Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argument that debt cannot be sustained by reputation alone. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:134 / 146
页数:13
相关论文
共 50 条