A Differential Privacy Incentive Compatible Mechanism and Equilibrium Analysis

In data analysis with interactive or non-interactive framework, the common assumption is that the data curators are credible. However, it is not reliable in reality. To that end, we propose, according to the incentive compatible mechanism, a differential privacy truthful mechanism, and in the mechanism, we analyze data privacy, utility and incentive compatible properties. Through analysis our scheme addresses the problem that data curator is not trust, and show it satisfies privacy and utility, and obtains the truthful tell. Another, differential privacy and availability is at odds with each other, the research of balance of between differential privacy and availability has been extensively developed, and availability is formulated as a quality of service. In this paper, to the balance problem of between differential privacy and availability, we only need to directly depend on utility function of the availability related to differential privacy budget, so we construct a game with respect to them and analyze the equilibrium of differential privacy and availability by using linear programming.