A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication

M. Rabin (1994. J. Econ. Theory 63, 374 391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ. 20. 568 587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth. Malouf. and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).