Multi-Market Competition, R&D, and Welfare in Oligopoly

被引：9
|
作者：
Kawasaki, Akio [1 ]
Lin, Ming Hsin [2 ]
Matsushima, Noriaki [3 ]
机构：
[1] Kagoshima Univ, Fac Educ, Kagoshima 8900065, Japan
[2] Osaka Univ Econ, Fac Econ, Osaka 5338533, Japan
[3] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Osaka 5670047, Japan
来源：
SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2014年 / 80卷 / 03期
关键词：
EXCESS-ENTRY THEOREM; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; FIRMS; SPILLOVERS; SUBSIDIES; INDUSTRY; DUOPOLY;
D O I：
10.4284/0038-4038-2012.190
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi-market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi-market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.
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页码：803 / 815
页数：13
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