Residential choice, mobility, and the labor market

There is substantial evidence suggesting that the process of suburbanization creates new job opportunities that are not equally exploited by all workers. In order to explain this phenomenon, a simple model is developed which incorporates borrowing constraints as an important restriction on moving decisions, obstructing the necessary labor flows between jurisdictions required to equalize (net) wages. In essence, people who cannot borrow will be restricted in terms of their capability of changing residence location and therefore will have limited possibilities of working in distant labor markets, or they will be subject to excessive commuting. Furthermore, the labor allocation induced by households' behavior facing these constraints affects consumer welfare. production, and producers' profits. The Outcomes with perfect credit markets and with borrowing restrictions are calculated and the economic welfare levels arc compared. As wages are flexible, they adjust to reflect the relative scarcity of workers present in each jurisdiction. Consequently, some of the negative effects of the borrowing constraints are compensated, so the outcomes cannot be easily compared. Some numerical examples are constructed to have an idea of the possible outcomes under different conditions. Finally, it is found that allowing for moving cost deductions from taxable income may help to alleviate the problem. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).