Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states, we also provide new evidence that points to the existence of a spatial autoregressive component to explaining corruption. We interpret this as consistent with the theoretical findings.
机构:
Fac Jean Monnet, ADIS GRJM, 54 Blvd Desgranges, F-92331 Sceaux, France
Univ Paris 01, Ctr ATOM, F-73013 Paris, FranceFac Jean Monnet, ADIS GRJM, 54 Blvd Desgranges, F-92331 Sceaux, France
Chong, Eshien
Huet, Freddy
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机构:
Univ Paris 01, Ctr ATOM, F-73013 Paris, France
Univ Reunion, CERESUR, F-97490 St Clotilde, FranceFac Jean Monnet, ADIS GRJM, 54 Blvd Desgranges, F-92331 Sceaux, France