How should food safety certification be financed?

被引:38
|
作者
Crespi, JM [1 ]
Marette, S
机构
[1] Kansas State Univ, Dept Agr Econ, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA
[2] INRA, INAPG, UMR Econ Publ, F-75231 Paris, France
关键词
asymmetric information; food safety; labeling; regulation; user fees;
D O I
10.1111/0002-9092.00214
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
An analytical framework where consumers are imperfectly informed about the safety of products is used to investigate the welfare effects of a public certification system. Several certification fees under alternative structures of certification cost are analyzed, By maintaining competition among numerous sellers, voluntary certification financed by a per-unit fee is efficient (and sufficient) to signal product safety. However, mandatory certification linked with a fixed user fee may be necessary if a seller wields monopoly power. Further, certification by a single, private agency results in a distorted fee.
引用
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页码:852 / 861
页数:10
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