Fragmentation to avoid overreaction to public information: A Coordination Game Application to Central Bank Communication Strategies

被引：0
|
作者：
Trabelsi, Emna [1 ]
机构：
[1] Inst Super Gest, Dept Quantitat Methods, Tunis, Tunisia
来源：
2013 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTROL, DECISION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES (CODIT) | 2013年
关键词：
Transparency; Central bank Communication; semi public information; private information; static coordination game; SOCIAL VALUE;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：943 / 950
页数：8
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