Philosophy of science after Mirowski's history of the philosophy of science

In summary, I believe that Mirowski is correct to claim that some contemporary philosophers of science studying the social dimensions of science show little awareness of the history of philosophical studies of the social dimensions of science. I have argued that this neglect of our past should be understood as a consequence of developments in the field of philosophy of science. When American philosophers embarked upon the project of scientific philosophy they adopted many of the practices of those they sought to emulate. In particular, they tended to be historically insensitive. First, they neglected the history of science in their studies of science. Second, they forgot their own history, the fact that philosophical studies of the social dimensions of science are not new. However, I have argued that philosophers of science can study the social dimensions of science in a manner that does not merely result in a justification of the status quo. In this respect, Mirowski's concerns are not insurmountable. I have suggested that philosophers should focus on examining the epistemic significance of changes in scientific practice. I suggested that my own research on collaborative research is an example of what can be done. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.