Multilayer Two-sided Platforms: The Role of Exclusive Contracts

被引:0
|
作者
MacCrory, Frank [1 ]
Shivendu, Shivendu [1 ]
机构
[1] Fordham Univ, Bronx, NY 10458 USA
关键词
NAKED EXCLUSION; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1109/HICSS.2013.414
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Mobile platforms are multilayer in the sense that application developers can access the users only through the two layers of the platform, namely operating systems (OS) and the carrier. Therefore, mobile platforms require contracting between OS and carrier as no firm has ability to connect both the layers of the platform. We develop a framework to study multilayer two-sided platforms and then examine the optimality of an exclusive contract by an entrant OS firm when the incumbent OS firm has non-exclusive contracts, such as Apple launching the iPhone when Blackberry was widely available. We show that exclusive contracts benefit entrant firm only if users have strong preferences for OSes, and paradoxically users benefit if developers enjoy weak cross-side network effects from those users. We also study the implications of exclusive contracts on social welfare and its implications for competition.
引用
收藏
页码:1474 / 1482
页数:9
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Private contracts in two-sided platforms
    Llanes, Gaston
    Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2021, 52 (04): : 815 - 838
  • [2] Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
    Mark Armstrong
    Julian Wright
    Economic Theory, 2007, 32 : 353 - 380
  • [3] Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts
    Armstrong, Mark
    Wright, Julian
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2007, 32 (02) : 353 - 380
  • [4] FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms
    Patro, Gourab K.
    Biswas, Arpita
    Ganguly, Niloy
    Gummadi, Krishna P.
    Chakraborty, Abhijnan
    WEB CONFERENCE 2020: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE (WWW 2020), 2020, : 1194 - 1204
  • [5] Exclusive content in two-sided markets
    Ishihara, Akifumi
    Oki, Ryoko
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 2021, 30 (03) : 638 - 654
  • [6] Jailbreaking in closed two-sided platforms
    Liu, Yunhao
    Feng, Gengzhong
    Sun, Yangyang
    Kong, Xiangyin
    INFORMATION & MANAGEMENT, 2023, 60 (08)
  • [7] Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms
    Hagiu, Andrei
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 37 (03): : 720 - 737
  • [8] Price disclosure by two-sided platforms
    Belleflamme, Paul
    Peitz, Martin
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2019, 67
  • [9] Seller competition on two-sided platforms
    Chawla, Neaketa
    Mondal, Debasis
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2024, 142 (03) : 213 - 245
  • [10] Collusion between two-sided platforms
    Lefouili, Yassine
    Pinho, Joana
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2020, 72 (72)