Where Corporate Governance and Financial Analysts Affect Valuation

被引:5
|
作者
Barniv, Ran R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Kent State Univ, Dept Accounting, Grad Sch Management, Kent, OH 44242 USA
关键词
RESIDUAL INCOME VALUATION; DISCLOSURE PRACTICES; FIRM VALUE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUATION; EMERGING MARKETS; VALUE-RELEVANCE; STOCK RETURNS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-646X.2009.01032.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether corporate governance and financial analysts affect accounting-based valuation models for B and H shares traded by foreign investors in China and Hong Kong, respectively. We expect that better corporate governance and more effective analyst activity mitigate potential adverse effects on accounting valuation models generated by country-specific problems in accounting, auditing, and legal systems. We find that valuation models perform better for companies with a greater analyst following, smaller forecast errors, relatively high public ownership and a strong board structure. Valuation models and accounting numbers have only limited explanatory power and valuation role for companies with weak governance and less effective analyst performance. The findings are robust across various market value, return, unexpected return, and other accounting valuation models. The results are consistent with less informed foreign investor clienteles searching for signals of more effective analyst activity and better corporate governance mechanisms.
引用
收藏
页码:240 / 273
页数:34
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