Quality, experience, and monopoly: the Soviet market for weapons under Stalin

被引:9
|
作者
Markevich, A [1 ]
Harrison, M
机构
[1] Moscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, All Russian External Multi Disciplinary Sch, Moscow, Russia
[2] Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] Univ Birmingham, Ctr Russian & E European Studies, Birmingham B15 2TT, W Midlands, England
[4] Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst War Revolut & Peace, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源
ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW | 2006年 / 59卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0289.2005.00334.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Monopoly is a particular problem in markets where experience goods are traded, since the consumer cannot respond to bad experiences by switching repeat purchases to another supplier. New evidence shows how the defence ministry as buyer in the Soviet market for military goods responded to this problem by investing in an evaluation of quality prior to purchase, by showing reluctance to buy, and by exploiting the available non-market means to influence the defence industry as supplier. The effectiveness of these stratagems was limited by the defence industry's counteractions and because the buyer had no choice but to come to a compromise with the supplier.
引用
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页码:113 / 142
页数:30
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