Local Labor Markets and Party Elite: Crafting Trade Policy in the United States House of Representatives

被引:1
|
作者
Hosek, Adrienne [1 ]
Peritz, Lauren [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Polit Sci, Davis, CA 95616 USA
关键词
American Congress; cosponsorship; globalization; labor market; protectionism; trade policy; BILL SPONSORSHIP; US HOUSE; INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; FIRMS; COSPONSORSHIP; CONSEQUENCES; GOVERNMENT; POLITICS; VOTES; GLOBALIZATION;
D O I
10.1561/100.00020048
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Driven by concerns over American jobs, factions within both the Democrat and Republican parties have appealed for greater trade protection. Does the legislative record reflect this rhetoric and have protectionist demands impacted the direction of trade policy in recent decades? Our answers are yes and no, respectively. We investigate the content of all 3356 trade bills introduced in Congress, 2005-2016, and classify them as liberalizing and protectionist. Analyzing legislator decisions to sponsor or cosponsor bills, we show that legislators who represent districts hardest hit by trade competition promote protectionism at a higher rate. We find strong evidence that district economic conditions reinforce the party position for Democrats and reveal intra-party cleavages among Republicans. Yet, these local interests are quickly side-lined in the legislative process. The few trade bills that become public law advance liberalization. The attrition process reflects the positions of party leadership who exercise gatekeeping powers to promote legislation that aligns with productive firms and the broader national interest. Thus we show how local economic conditions, partisan politics, and Congressional elite jointly shape the direction of trade policy, reinforcing U.S. engagement in the global economy.
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页码:451 / 489
页数:39
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