Bargaining with imperfect commitment

被引:55
作者
Kambe, S [1 ]
机构
[1] Gakushuin Univ, Fac Econ, Toshima Ku, Tokyo 1718588, Japan
关键词
unique equilibrium; war of attrition;
D O I
10.1006/game.1998.0700
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two-person bargaining games. By establishing the reputation for being stubborn, a player sometimes commits to her initial demand, becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent. When the probability of being stubborn is small, the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness. A player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and/or is more likely to be stubborn. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:217 / 237
页数:21
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