The statutory union recognition procedure in the Employment Relations Bill: A comparative analysis

This paper analyses the provisions for union recognition contained in the British Employment Relations Bill in the light of problems with the system in operation in the 1970s and with its US counterpart. First, it establishes that these problems may be attributable largely to defects in design rather than fundamental flaws, and that this is demonstrated by the relative success of the Canadian system. Second, the paper evaluates the Bill's provisions, finding that it avoids many weaknesses of the 1970s and US systems but lacks a number of the Canadian system's strengths. Consequently recognition may be readily attainable if the union already has a majority, but there could be undue delays and opportunities for employer interference if this is not the case, and in general union recognition may not translate into effective collective bargaining. However, if the provisions do help diffuse the partnership model as the government envisages, apparent weaknesses in the Bill may yet prove to be the hallmarks of a distinctive system.