Cheap talk, cooperation, and trust in global software engineering

In our studies of global software engineering (GSE) teams, we found that informal, non-work-related conversations are positively associated with trust. Seeking to use novel analytical techniques to more carefully investigate this phenomenon, we described these non-work-related conversations by adapting the economics literature concept of "cheap talk," and studied it using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). More specifically, we modified the classic Stag-hunt game and analyzed the dynamics in a fixed population setting (an abstraction of a GSE team). Doing so, we were able to demonstrate how cheap talk over the Internet (e-cheap talk) was powerful enough to facilitate the emergence of trust and improve the probability of cooperation where the punishment for uncooperative behavior is comparable to the cost of the cheap talk. To validate the results of our theoretical approach, we conducted two empirical case studies that analyzed the logged IRC development discussions of Apache Lucene and Chromium OS using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The results provide general support to the theoretical propositions. We discuss our findings and the theoretical and practical implications to GSE collaborations and research.