SHORT-RUN SUBSIDIES AND LONG-RUN ADOPTION OF NEW HEALTH PRODUCTS: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

被引:178
|
作者
Dupas, Pascaline [1 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Technology adoption; experimentation; social learning; anchoring; malaria; prevention; TREATED BED NETS; CHILD-MORTALITY; MALARIA; PRICES; PREVENT; DEMAND; CHOICE;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA9508
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Short-run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries. How do they affect long-run adoption? A common fear among development practitioners is that one-off subsidies may negatively affect long-run adoption through reference-dependence: People might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later. But for experience goods, one-off subsidies could also boost long-run adoption through learning. This paper uses data from a two-stage randomized pricing experiment in Kenya to estimate the relative importance of these effects for a new, improved antimalarial bed net. Reduced form estimates show that a one-time subsidy has a positive impact on willingness to pay a year later inherit. To separately identify the learning and anchoring effects, we estimate a parsimonious experience-good model. Estimation results show a large, positive learning effect but no anchoring. We black then discuss the types of products and the contexts inherit for which these results may apply.
引用
收藏
页码:197 / 228
页数:32
相关论文
共 50 条