Epicurus on the Subject of Perception

Modern scholars are puzzled by the Epicurean claim that all perceptions are true. They find it hard to make any sense of it and therefore often reject Epicurus' argument as 'simple minded'. However, a very similar claim can be found in Aristotle's De anima. Aristotle distinguishes between the different objects of perception, and he considers inerrancy to be a distinctive feature of the perception of proper sensibles. But contrary to Aristotle, Epicurus stresses not only that all perceptions but, moreover, all phantasiai are true. The special role attributed to phantasia in epistemology is a feature Epicurus shares with other Hellenistic schools and which crucially distinguishes them from Aristotle. A distinctive mark of phantasia is that, contrary to perception, a twofold object is involved: on the one hand the represented object and on the other phantasia itself. For this reason, the Stoics compared phantasia with light that at the same time reveals the object and itself. This paper will shed some light on Epicurus' theory of perception by concentrating on different objects of phantasia. It will be argued that these objects refer to distinct ontological levels to which different conceptions of truth are applied.