In this paper we compare and contrast the most profitable modes of licensing a cost-reducing invention by an inventor who is an industry incumbent with one who is not. We find that an industry incumbent favors licensing by means of a royalty per unit of output to which the new technology is applied while an outsider prefers to auction off a fixed number of licences outright. Our analysis also suggests that an outside inventor finds it most profitable to target greater cost-reducing inventions to monopolistic industries while an incumbent inventor favors competitive industries.
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Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
Fan, Cuihong
Jun, Byoung Heon
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Korea Univ, Dept Econ, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South KoreaShanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
Jun, Byoung Heon
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
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Korea Univ, Dept Econ, 145 Anam Ro, Seoul 02841, South Korea
Humboldt Univ, Inst F Wirtschaftstheorie 1, Spandauer Str 1, D-10178 Berlin, GermanyShanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China