Conditional Status Quo Bias and Top Income Shares: How U.S. Political Institutions Have Benefited the Rich

被引:39
|
作者
Enns, Peter K. [1 ]
Kelly, Nathan J. [2 ]
Morgan, Jana [2 ]
Volscho, Thomas [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Witko, Christopher [6 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Dept Govt, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA
[2] Univ Tennessee, Dept Polit Sci, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA
[3] CUNY, Dept Sociol, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA
[4] CUNY, Dept Anthropol, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA
[5] CUNY, Dept Social Work, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA
[6] Univ S Carolina, Dept Polit Sci, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF POLITICS | 2014年 / 76卷 / 02期
关键词
AGENDA CONTROL; REDISTRIBUTION; INEQUALITY; DYNAMICS; HOUSE; RISE;
D O I
10.1017/S0022381613001321
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article develops and tests a model of conditional status quo bias and American inequality. We find that institutional features that bias policy outcomes toward the status quo have played a central role in the path of inequality. Using time-series analysis of top income shares during the post-Depression period, we identify the Senate as a key actor in the politics of income inequality. Our findings suggest that the supermajoritarian nature of the Senate and policy stagnation, when coupled with economic and social factors that produce rising inequality, create a situation in which inequality becomes difficult to reverse.
引用
收藏
页码:289 / 303
页数:15
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