LOBOTOMY An Architecture for JIT Spraying Mitigation

JIT spraying has an assured spot in an attacker's toolkit for Web browser exploitation: With JIT spraying an attacker is able to circumvent even the most sophisticated defense strategies against code injection, including address space layout randomization (ASLR), data execution prevention (DEP) and stack canaries. In this paper, we present LOBOTOMY, an architecture for building injection-safe JIT engines. LOBOTOMY is secure by design: it separates compiler and executor of a JIT engine in different processes that share the memory regions containing the compiled code. This allows us to use least-privilege access rights for both processes, preventing memory regions to be mapped with write-and execute-rights at the same time. Our proof-of-concept implementation that modifies the well-known Firefox JIT engine Tracemonkey shows both the effectiveness and real-world feasibility of our architecture. Additionally, we provide a thorough evaluation of our version compared to an unmodified baseline and competing approaches.