Credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on-the-job search

被引:1
|
作者
Bartolucci, Cristian [1 ]
机构
[1] Coll Carlo Alberto, I-10024 Turin, Italy
关键词
Credible threats; On-the-job search; Wage renegotiation; EARNINGS;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.029
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, renegotiation does not require mutual consent. if the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation, wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:657 / 659
页数:3
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