This note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, renegotiation does not require mutual consent. if the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation, wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAStanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Hall, Robert E.
Krueger, Alan B.
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机构:
Princeton Univ, Woodrow Wilson Sch, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USAStanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA 94305 USA