Pay as You Speed, ISA with incentives for not speeding: A case of test driver recruitment

The Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) project we describe in this article is based on Pay as You Drive principles. These principles assume that the ISA equipment informs a driver of the speed limit, warns the driver when speeding and calculates penalty points. Each penalty point entails the reduction of a 30% discount on the driver's car insurance premium, which therefore produced the name, Pay as You Speed. The ISA equipment consists of a GPS-based On Board Unit with a mobile phone connection to a web server. The project was planned for a three-year test period with 300 young car drivers, but it never succeeded in recruiting that number of drivers. After several design changes, the project eventually went forward with 153 test drivers of all ages. This number represents approximately one thousandth of all car owners in the proving ground of North Jutland in Denmark. Furthermore the project was terminated before its scheduled closing date. This article describes the project with an emphasis on recruitment efforts and the project's progress. We include a discussion of possible explanations for the failure to recruit volunteers for the project and reflect upon the general barriers to using ISA with ordinary drivers. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.