Insiders' incentives for asymmetric disclosure and firm-specific information flows

被引：5

作者：

Jiang, Li ^{[1
]}

Kim, Jeong-Bon ^{[2
]}

Pang, Lei ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Accountancy, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Dept Finance & Decis Sci, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2013年 / 37卷 / 09期

关键词：

Timing of disclosure; Stock price informativeness; Control-ownership wedge; Jump risks; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; PRICE INFORMATIVENESS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CONDITIONAL SKEWNESS; ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP; STOCK; RISK; MARKETS; IMPROVE; MERGERS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Recent research suggests that insiders' incentives for capturing cash flows affect price formation process in which insiders are inclined to withhold good news and to accelerate the release of bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006). We investigate whether insiders' incentives for private control benefit, proxied by control-ownership wedge, affect firm-specific return characteristics. We find that control-ownership wedge is negatively related to the likelihood of positive return jumps and positively related to the extent of asymmetric market reaction to good news rather than to bad news. Overall, our results support the notion that corporate insiders increase opaqueness and withhold good news in order to capture unexpected cash flow. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：3562 / 3576

页数：15

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