Observability and incentive in organizations

被引：2
|
作者：
Li, Sanxi [1 ]
Ye, Bing [2 ]
Yu, Jianyu [3 ]
机构：
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[2] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Econ, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
[3] SW Univ Finance & Econ, Res Inst Econ & Management, Chengdu 610074, Peoples R China
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 114卷 / 02期
关键词：
Producer-owned firm; Investor-owned firm; Moral hazard in team; Observability;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.025
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The paper shows that producer-owned firms are more efficient in quality provision than investor-owned firms if input quality is observable, while they are less efficient when the input quality is unobservable and the size of the organization is large. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：205 / 207
页数：3
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