Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence

被引：30
|
作者：
Li, Sanxi [1 ]
Ma, Hongkun [2 ]
Zeng, Chenhang [2 ]
机构：
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[2] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2015年 / 134卷
关键词：
Cross holding; Entry deterrence; Passive ownership; PARTIAL OWNERSHIP; COLLUSION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper builds a duopoly model to study the strategic effects of cross holding on entry deterrence. We show that, in equilibrium, the incumbent optimally chooses strictly positive cross holdings in each other to deter entry for the potential entrant. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：37 / 40
页数：4
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