POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN CHINESE COMPANIES

被引:76
作者
Su, Zhong-qin [1 ]
Fung, Hung-Gay [2 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Jiaotong Univ, Chengdu 610031, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Missouri St Louis, St Louis, MO USA
关键词
CORPORATE-FINANCE; CASH; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1111/1468-0106.12025
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study uses panel data analysis to examine the relationship between political connections and firm performance in Chinese firms from 2004 to 2008. We define firm-level political connections and demonstrate a robust result for the positive relationship between political connections and firm performance. In addition, we integrate the effects of ownership structure, relatedparty transactions and political connections into our analysis and continue to show a positive relationship. We show that political connections dampen the negative effect on firm value of related-party transactions. Finally, we demonstrate channels through which the benefits of political connections are realized in terms of greater cash holdings, larger long-term loans, lower financing costs, larger sales and lower sales costs. Our results indicate that state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises use political connections equally effectively to enhance performance.
引用
收藏
页码:283 / 317
页数:35
相关论文
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