Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology

被引:14
|
作者
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Kenan Inst Eth, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] Duke Univ, Dept Philosophy, Durham, NC 27708 USA
关键词
emotion; framing effect; moral judgment; reason; reliability;
D O I
10.1177/1754073911402382
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people.
引用
收藏
页码:288 / 289
页数:2
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