Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment

被引:26
|
作者
Woo, Byungwon [1 ]
机构
[1] Oakland Univ, Rochester, MI 48309 USA
关键词
foreign direct investment; international crises; International Monetary Fund; INTERNATIONAL-MONETARY-FUND; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; CATALYTIC FINANCE; HUMAN-RIGHTS; AGREEMENTS; INTERESTS; INFLOWS; WORK;
D O I
10.1080/03050629.2013.782303
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The article explores how International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design influences foreign direct investment inflows. The author argues that stricter IMF conditionality signals a program-participating government's commitment to economic reforms, as it incurs larger ex ante political cost and risks greater ex post political cost. Thus, the catalytic effect of an IMF program is conditional on conditionality: programs with stricter conditions catalyze more foreign direct investment than those with less stringent conditions. Empirical analysis of the IMF conditionality dataset supports the argument and shows that after accounting for IMF program participation, the more structural conditions included in an IMF program, the more foreign direct investment flows into the country.
引用
收藏
页码:292 / 315
页数:24
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