Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation

被引：0
|
作者：
Contreras, Roberto [1 ]
Georgantzis, Nikolaos [2 ,3 ]
Gines, Miguel [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Tecnol Metropolitana, Dept Econ, Santiago, Chile
[2] Univ Jaume 1, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana, Spain
[3] Univ Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana, Spain
来源：
ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMIA | 2008年 / 35卷 / 01期
关键词：
collusion; product differentiation; decreasing returns to scale;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable independent of the differentiation degree.
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页码：19 / 31
页数：13
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