Excess perks in SOEs: evidence from China

被引：0
|
作者：
Ren, Xiaoyi [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Xing [1 ,2 ]
Tian, Zongtao [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Chongqing Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Accounting, Chongqing, Peoples R China
[2] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[3] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Accounting, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[4] Chongqing Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Chongqing, Peoples R China
来源：
ASIAN-PACIFIC ECONOMIC LITERATURE | 2020年 / 34卷 / 02期
关键词：
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; AGENCY PROBLEMS; CORPORATE; PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS; COSTS; STATE; FIRM; PRIVATIZATION;
D O I：
10.1111/apel.12300
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In investigating the relationship between economic directors (EDs) and excess perks in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, we find a U-shaped relationship between the share of EDs on boards and excess perks, especially in SOEs controlled by local governments and with greater managerial power-as well as in regions with poor legal systems. The share of EDs on boards may have three benefits with respect to reducing the use of excess perks in SOEs: (1) replacing excess perks with monetary wages more aligned with the value of managers; (2) reducing the increase in excessive perks caused by the availability of free cash flow; and (3) reducing the use of excess employees to drive excess perks.
引用
收藏
页码：152 / 165
页数：14
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