Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability

被引：7

作者：

Wagner, Christoph ^{[1
]}

Mylovanov, Tymofiy ^{[2
]}

Troegr, Thomas ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

[2] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

[3] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2015年 / 159卷

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Information rents; Informed principal; Mechanism design; Moral hazard; Signaling; AGENT RELATIONSHIP; PRIVATE VALUES; MECHANISM DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a principal agent moral-hazard problem with risk-neutral parties and no limited liability in which the principal has private information. The principal's private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented outcome. These distortions can explain, e.g., efficiency wages (Beaudry, 1994) and muted incentives (Inderst, 2001). We show that in a large class of environments these distortions vanish if the principal is allowed to offer sufficiently rich contracts. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.

引用

页码：280 / 289

页数：10

共 41 条

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