When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns

被引：6

作者：

Liu, Yaozhou Franklin ^{[1
]}

Sanyal, Amal ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Sydney, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

[2] Lincoln Univ, Fac Commerce, Christchurch 7647, New Zealand

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2012年 / 84卷 / 01期

关键词：

Career concerns; Reputational cheap-talk; Signaling game; TRANSPARENCY; REPUTATION; COMMITTEES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2012.07.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially started on the advice of an expert if she gets some unfavorable interim news. But if the status quo is reinstated, the principal is unable to verify the true state of the world. In the model, experts want to appear smart and we find that the possibility of canceling the action encourages less well informed experts to recommend it more often. We then show that gaining access to interim news as well as improving the quality of an existing one can both reduce the principal's welfare. The model implies that delegating the decision rights to another person with different preferences can be used as a commitment device by the principal and might improve her welfare. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 16

页数：16